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Introduction 
The war and presence of ISIS in Syria and neighboring countries has initiated a stream of 
refugees in recent years. This influx of migrants has raised serious concerns among 
member states of the European Union, whose concerns about their absorption capacity 
have become supplemented with worries about possible terrorist threats. On one hand, the 
latter seems irrational; besides the possibility that terrorists disguised as refugees utilize 
migration routes to Europe, why would refugees escaping war and terrorism turn into 
terrorists in their host country? This seems especially unlikely in the case of refugees who 
apply for asylum and hope to settle securely at least for some time in their new countries. 
On the other hand, when their process of settling in and requesting asylum could end in 
failure, they may turn into ‘irregular migrants’ with very little legal options2. If the 
receiving society is unable or unwilling to meet crucial needs of these irregular migrants, 
alternative environments such as extremist networks may become appealing. A previous 
study in the Netherlands did illustrate a disproportionate presence of irregular migrants in 
jihadist networks
3
. Irregular migrants, who had exhausted all legal procedures to obtain a 
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residence permit, became affiliated with jihadist networks and conducted all kinds of 
tasks within these networks. Building on this finding, we investigated to what extent and 
why jihadist networks were appealing to irregular migrants in the Netherlands. Although 
ideology usually gets a lot of weight when explaining jihadist involvement, a possible 
complementary explanation that is often neglected is the pragmatic value of such 
networks. Several studies have shown that many members of jihadist networks are 
vulnerable individuals who search for solutions in order to deal with their alleged 
deprived situation
4
. The current chapter will therefore try to lay bare this pragmatic value 
of jihadist networks to find out whether this can explain, in some part, the attractiveness 
of jihadist networks to irregular Muslim migrants in the past. 
The findings analyzed below are based on an extensive analysis of voluminous 
police files and additional semi-structured interviews with experts in the field. We do not 
seek for the explicit motivations that drove migrants to join jihadist networks, but merely 
focus on (documented) activities and behavior. The studied networks are associated with 
the Jihadi-Salafist ideology. This ideology aims at a return to the pure interpretation of 
Islam, as it was lived in the original Muslim community (umma) in the time of the 
prophet Muhammed and the following caliphates
5
, and approves the use of violence to 
materialize this ambition
6
. Within these networks we selectively focus on migrants 
without residence rights in the Netherlands, who have come to the attention of the 
authorities because of their alleged involvement with terrorism. It should be kept in mind 
that the vast majority of irregular Muslim migrants in the Netherlands, does not conduct 
unlawful activities
7
. Some of them engage in crime, but joining a jihadist network is very 
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rare. So we focus on a very specific but nonetheless critical category of migrants. Before 
we present our findings, we will focus on existing literature in this field, and provide a 
brief overview of the methods used.  
 
Background factors of radical Muslims and irregular migrants 
Radical Muslims and irregular migrants appear to be very different categories of 
individuals. Yet, an analysis of selected radicalization and migration studies elucidates 
that for young man within those categories, similar background factors have been 
described. Firstly, radical Muslims and irregular migrants suffer respectively from 
relative and absolute deprivation. This perceived deprivation among radical Muslims is 
influenced by the generally low socio-economic position of Muslims in Western 
societies, which they see as unfair
8
. They feel that society failed them
9
. Irregular migrants 
experience absolute deprivation due to their formal exclusion from society. The 
restrictive migration policy in the Netherlands, especially since the enactment of the 
Linking Act (1998; Amendment of the Dutch Aliens Act), enhanced the systematic 
exclusion from public services such as non-essential health care, public housing and 
social security. Second, both irregular migrants as well as Dutch Muslims living in the 
Netherlands struggle with identity problems. Dutch Muslims suffer from negative 
stigmas and exclusion
10
, whereas the identity of male irregular migrants as caretaker of 
the family is jeopardized when they are not able to provide an income
11
. Finally, mental 
problems play a role. For both groups, deprivation and identity problems lead to 
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insecurity
12
, psychological and physical problems
13
, and strong emotional responses
14
. In 
sum, although the causes are different, young Dutch Muslims as well as illegal migrants 
can experience similar problems and end up in similar positions according to the 
literature.   
  
Behavioral responses to encountered problems 
Radicalization studies focus on how religion, ideology, group membership, and solidarity 
can be seen as answers to aforementioned problems
15
. Although these findings are highly 
valuable, this approach often ignores practical considerations. Besides faith and belief in 
a higher purpose, radical networks can also provide other benefits, such as material 
support and access to different kinds of goods and services
16
. These benefits can be 
provided through illegal means and crime, as the studies on the crime-terror nexus 
illustrate. Whereas crime is often depicted as a tool to invigorate funding for terrorist 
plots
17
, crime is rarely seen as a mechanism to attract recruits. Migration studies, which 
often depart from a functionalist perspective with regard to criminal involvement, offer 
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supplementary insights. Based on Merton’s strain theory18, migration scholars argue that 
by a lack of resources, migrants may adopt practical coping strategies in order to deal 
with deprivation
19
. The social capital of irregular migrants plays an important role in that 
regard, and is often embedded in networks of relatives, friends, and acquaintances
20
. 
However, when their social networks are unable to provide for basic needs in a legal 
manner, some irregular migrants get involved in criminal activity. To these groups, 
survival crime can offer a practical alternative to informal employment
21
. We therefore 
assume that a similar process may play a role with jihadist networks. The current study 
therefore focuses on the criminal aspects of jihadist networks, to see how it attracts new 
people.  
 
Methodology 
Data 
Following the foregoing theoretical integration, we depart from two complementary 
perspectives. On one hand, from the perspective of the irregular migrant, who may be 
driven towards jihadist networks for different reasons. To explore their needs and 
frustrations, we have conducted 23 semi-structured interviews with key-informants from 
asylum centers (AC) and detention centers (DC)22. These are the prime locations where, 
for this research, relevant migrants who may end up as irregular migrants concentrate. In 
these centers thirteen semi-structured interviews were conducted with staff members with 
different executive positions, who work in close relation with the population of migrants 
over a longer course of time. Furthermore, 10 out of 11 Imams who worked at the time of 
research for the Custodial Institutions Agency engaged in a focus group interview. All the 
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23 interviews were conducted in the first quarter of 2012, which means that the findings 
from these interviews should be seen in that particular context. 
 Secondly, we focus on the perspective of jihadist networks. To explore the 
practical benefits of these networks, we have analyzed 12 large-scale confidential police 
investigations on jihadist terrorist activities in the Netherlands, containing information on 
the period 2000-2005. We selected four jihadist networks from these files, yielding 41 
jihadists without a legal residence status to further analyze their documented behavior23. 
Table 1 shows the background characteristics of the migrants concerned. In addition, we 
conducted 10 semi-structured interviews with public prosecutors and team leaders of the 
police who were closely involved in the studied police cases. This enabled us to place the 
information from the police files in perspective. Although we have combined different 
sources of data, including very rich police files, we must keep in mind that we have only 
been able to use indirect information. Therefore, the results must be interpreted with care.  
 
Data analysis and limitations 
To gather and analyze the rich data, we developed a documentation sheet to scrutinize 
suspect hearings, witness statements, original wiretap transcripts (both telephone and 
internet), observation reports, reports of house searches, and other relevant information 
from the police investigations. We then applied a coding procedure derived from 
grounded theory methods. This is a methodology that aims to generate theories 
inductively, rather than deductively. In other words, a researcher is motivated to create 
data-driven theories by applying extensive coding procedures and consequently letting 
the data speak, instead of testing hypotheses derived from existing theories which are not 
necessarily built on empirical data. While applying these procedures, we formulated our 
own definitions and categorizations rather than copying police classifications.
24
 The use 
of police files as a source of data is unique but also comes with inherent limitations: (1) 
not all jihadist activities and background data are known to the police; (2) whether to start 
an investigation is guided by investigation policy choices and priorities; (3) the initial aim 
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of the files is to inform a judge; (4) the case selection is limited to the period 2000-2005 
and the current findings should therefore be seen in that specific context and interpreted 
with great care; (5) the so-called groups are in reality less well defined than the police 
investigations often portray them to be; (6) many subjects within the analyzed radical 
networks appear to show different degrees of involvement, which does not always 
warrant the label of ‘terrorist’. The nature and composition of the four selected networks 
are summarized in Table 2, which also shows the time of investigation, the (terrorist and 
criminal) activities observed and the number of irregular migrants involved25.  
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Table 1. Demographic facts of 41 irregular immigrants within the criminal 
investigations. 
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 Further information about employment is lacking, this is most likely to be illegal labor. 
 Demografic facts Absolute numbers 
 Gender   
 Male 41 
 Female  0 
     
 Age    
 ≤25 year  9 
 26-35 year 19 
 ≥36 year 10 
 Unknown 3 
     
 Native country   
 Algeria 27 
 Morocco 5 
 Other 9 
 Unknown 0 
     
 Marital status   
 Married 10 
 Single 2 
 Unknown 29 
     
 Completed Education   
 Tertiary Education 5 
 Primary/Secondary Education 2 
 Unknown 34 
     
 Employed
26
/study   
 Yes 19 
 No 3 
 Unknown 19 
 9 
Network 
no. 
Years 
investigated 
Number 
of 
subjects 
Number of 
irregular 
immigrants 
Intent of terrorism Criminal activities 
 
 
1 
 
 
2000-2001 29 9 
- Plans for suicide 
bombing  
- Passport theft 
- Passport forgery 
- Burglary 
- Credit card fraud/ 
skimming 
- Trade in counterfeit 
clothing 
 
 
2 
 
 
2001-2003 36 26 
- Facilitating 
liquidation 
- Recruiting 
foreign fighters 
for jihad 
- Facilitating 
foreign fighters 
for jihad 
- Weapon trade 
- Passport theft 
- Passport forgery 
- Shoplifting 
- Drug trafficking  
 
 
3 
2003-2005 11 4 
- Recruitment for 
jihad 
- Possession of 
weapons 
- Passport forgery 
- Human trafficking  
 
4 
 
2003-2005 48 3 
- Ideological 
liquidation 
- Plans for 
attacking 
government 
buildings 
- Weapon trade 
- Passport fraud 
- Identity fraud 
- Shoplifting 
 
Table 2: The nature of jihadist networks based on police investigations.
27
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Findings 
Problems and needs of irregular migrants 
The key informants within the detention facilities emphasized the grim conditions asylum 
seekers live in. They share relatively small and plain living spaces with several people, 
leading to limited privacy and regular social conflicts. Asylum seekers are supposed to 
organize their own leisure activities, but have difficulties integrating into society due to 
their lack of contacts and language skills. In addition, their financial opportunities are 
limited to the weekly compensation by the Dutch government, as they are not allowed to 
work. Furthermore, in a DC irregular migrants are subjected to a prison regime, which 
means they cannot leave the premises to work or undertake any social activities in 
society. Contrary to the AC though, social activities are organized in the DC and the 
living facilities offer a little bit more privacy than in the AC. Nonetheless, the living 
conditions in DCs are still frugal and inhumane, according to a Dutch study.28 
 Until 2010, asylum seekers had to deal with asylum procedures that could last for 
years. Since the Amendment of the Dutch Aliens Act 2000 in 2010 this process has been 
accelerated, but asylum seekers are still confronted with time-consuming procedures, 
which tend to make them passive. DC respondents stated that rejected asylum seekers 
often do not leave the country after the final negative decision. Consequently, according 
to the respondents, they become irregular migrants, who have very little to fall back upon 
and therefore often start committing petty crimes. Many of them, according to the 
respondents, return to the DC after a while and attempt to start a new asylum procedure. 
Many migrants concerned perceive the negative decision in their case and the way they 
have been treated as unjust. In the DC this is combined with feelings of anger, because 
migrants perceive their behavior as non-criminal while they are literally detained. This 
dissatisfaction fuels a sense of ‘us versus them’. The Imams in the detention centers also 
observe these feelings and attempt to mollify them. Still, some of the migrants think they 
are detained because they are Muslim, which makes it difficult to influence their views. 
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 A negative decision by the authorities can cause an emotional outburst of anger 
and disappointment, according to the respondents, varying from verbal expression to 
physical aggression. In most extreme cases (which were rare), staff members are 
threatened or migrants may demonstrate suicidal intentions: 
 
“Sometimes it can become personal. They start threatening you and shout ‘I will 
not leave! I will not let myself be deported’[…]. They sometimes threaten you with 
death, such as ‘If I run into you outside…you wait, I’ll get you. I will kill you if I 
run into you outside’.” (Staff member 1, Detention Center, March 6th 2012)  
 
In these situations, the Imams attempt to play a neutralizing role, because they are 
relatively close to the migrants. But the respondents in both AC and DC unanimously 
state that basically all migrants develop some form of mental instability, which can be 
intensified when the migrants have to deal with a negative decision concerning their 
asylum application or due to the living conditions. This often leads to conflicts, 
depression, or social isolation: 
 
“The threshold for conflicts is much lower after some time. Nothing major, but for 
the people enough to let the bubble burst. This can be caused by the living 
conditions but predominantly by the psychological problems and the pressure of 
the procedure. They have a lot to deal with in this couple of weeks.” (Staff 
member 21, Asylum Center, February 27
th
 2012) 
 
To conclude, the interviews confirm the aforementioned problems of deprivation and 
mental instability among irregular migrants.  
Pragmatic solutions by jihadist networks 
Drawing on the police investigations, the population of irregular Muslim migrants in our 
study proved heterogeneous. On one hand, we found seven heartland-oriented subjects 
who appeared to have ‘imported’ the Jihadi-Salafist ideology into the Netherlands and 
whose status in their networks seemed to be largely based on Quran knowledge and 
former jihadist experiences. We also found 34 irregular Muslim migrants who could not 
 12 
claim a similar background. They seemed to have become active in the jihadist 
movement only after they migrated to the Netherlands. In the present chapter we 
predominantly focus on these 34 subjects, whose marginalized position seems to be an 
important factor influencing their affiliation with the analyzed networks. We base this 
conclusion on their active engagement in facilitating rather than ideological activities. It 
seems that these activities acted as a pull-factor, because they provide them with practical 
benefits such as residential, travel, and financial opportunities.   
One of the core activities of the networks was crime in the form of theft and 
forgery of passports. These activities enabled members to travel to jihad training and 
fighting hotspots abroad, but also provided them with fake residence permits for the 
Netherlands. During several house searches, the police found a wide variety of stolen 
documents including foreign passports, identity cards, and marriage certificates. In one 
case, the police also found a stock of passports which was stolen from a foreign 
municipality years before. The irregular migrants in these networks were also actively 
engaged in the forgery of stolen passports. For example, during a house search in a house 
inhabited by irregular migrants from network 1, the police found a counterfeiting 
workshop and confiscated around 60 stolen documents (passports, ID-cards, driving 
licenses) from all over the world. They also detected equipment to forge these 
documents; needles, (municipality) stamps, markers, folding and cropping equipment for 
photo processing, and press molds. Other irregular migrants from network 2 also 
possessed counterfeiting equipment that enabled them to forge Dutch, Belgian, French, 
Spanish, and British documents. The police also found laminate, a laminator, blank cards, 
blank identity cards, punch letters, an instruction manual, and printers. Some irregular 
migrants claimed that they explicitly conducted these criminal activities to help other 
irregular Muslim migrants. Sometimes, these activities helped them to gain entry to the 
Netherlands with the help of smugglers or through sham marriages. Network 3 uses these 
methods in order to offer an alternative migration entry. For example, an irregular 
migrant tried to obtain Dutch citizenship with the coordinated help of a jihadist who had 
already helped him to travel to the Netherlands with smugglers. The wiretap transcripts 
documented how they tried to arrange a sham marriage by persuading a woman to marry 
him for the reward of 2,000 Euros. 
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Not only can forged documents offer members of jihadist networks a semi-legal 
existence, selling them to other irregular migrants is also a lucrative business. Subjects 
from network 1 claimed to make a 150 German Marks profit for each sold forged 
document. In network 2, the profit per forged document varied between 50 and 300 
Euros. These revenues were used to finance terrorist purposes, maintain the members of 
the networks or to support other jihadists worldwide. Financial investigations showed 
how some transactions made by members of network 1 were directed to other foreign 
jihadists who allegedly forwarded this to training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
These findings imply that theft and forgery of documents facilitated the jihadist 
movement, but also offered an alternative to an irregular position in society. According to 
an irregular migrant from network 2, he started to work for the network in return for a 
passport that he could not pay for. By helping with forgery and bringing in new 
customers, he could pay off his debt. He was also financially assisted in renting his 
apartment, whilst in return the network placed counterfeiting equipment in his apartment.   
Other criminal activities conducted by jihadist networks that led to significant 
financial gain according to the police files were credit card fraud, transportations of 
drugs, and burglaries. Again, several irregular migrants were engaged in these activities. 
For instance, several subjects travelled throughout Europe in order to buy stolen credit 
cards and then used them in other countries. They possessed a skimming machine and the 
records of 45 different names and account numbers. They had connections with people 
across the world, who were able to either send or place skimming equipment. In addition, 
the police traced three separate drug transportations coordinated by subjects in network 2. 
They confiscated 27,000 Euros when they intercepted the first transport. A third transport 
failed because one of the members stole the transportation truck and sold the cocaine for 
his personal gain. Finally, some irregular migrants in network 1 conducted residential 
burglaries, in which they specifically aimed for passports. However, they also stole 
random goods such as an alarm clock, coffee, fruit, towels, shampoo, reading glasses, and 
a sleeping bag. Furthermore, several irregular migrants in network 2 were notorious 
shoplifters who specifically aimed at stealing clothes. The purpose of the stolen goods 
was initially to provide for foreign jihadists during their temporary stay in the 
 14 
Netherlands. However, regarding the nature of many of these goods, we assume that it is 
also a way to provide irregular migrants with basic necessities.    
Another benefit of the forged documents for irregular migrants was the 
opportunity to be formally employed or to gain access to social services. An irregular 
migrant in network 1 tried to obtain a Dutch social security number by registering at a 
government institution while using a forged French passport. In addition, another subject 
in network 2 provided several irregular migrants with a social security number and a 
forged passport (next to food, shelter, and train tickets), which they used to register at an 
employment agency. As a result, some of the irregular migrants started to see him as a 
social worker and stayed closely connected to him. In network 3 several members were 
closely linked to a shady employment agency that accepted false passports. The members 
brought in new irregular migrants who had just entered the country with the help of 
smugglers to this agency, which in turn arranged jobs for them. 
Finally, the networks concerned offered housing opportunities to the irregular 
migrants in houses of fellow subjects. Some subjects opened up their house to irregular 
migrants who were in need of shelter or accommodation. Others continuously moved in 
and out with members of the group they had met in the AC.  
 
Conclusion 
Many terrorism studies assume that subjects within extremist movements have embraced 
and internalized a radical religious ideology, implying that these subjects are per se 
attracted and motivated by ideology. This chapter has nuanced or at least complemented 
this assumption, by bringing together the vulnerable position of irregular migrants and 
the pragmatic value of jihadist network.  
The analysis of a selective sample of irregular migrants involved in jihadist 
networks between 2000 and 2005 in the Netherlands, was based on a range of rich police 
investigations and additional semi-structures interviews with key informants. Based on 
the interviews, we started out by mapping the problems that asylum seekers and irregular 
migrants in ACs and DCs encounter in their daily lives. The data showed that many of 
the migrants involved appeared to struggle with feelings of deprivation and mental issues. 
Next, based on an analysis of extensive and well-documented police files, we focused on 
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the practical solutions jihadist networks were able to offer. Criminal activities appeared 
to offer the most helpful solutions, which clearly indicated the pragmatic value of the 
networks. At least for our case study, this seemed to be more important as a pull-factor 
than often assumed.  
The illustrated findings may be applicable for a particular phase and place, but 
they do have wider implications. First, these findings shed a different light on the crime-
terror nexus discussion. A pragmatic solution – such as engaging in income generating 
crime – is not only beneficial to fund terrorism and facilitate the pursuit of ideological 
goals, but can also attract vulnerable new members. Second, it warns for potential 
negative outcomes of an inadequate response to the influx of refugees. When they do not 
obtain a residence status and when they are not able to live under reasonable 
circumstances, this vulnerable position may lead them to look for alternative forms of 
integration, for instance into criminal and/or radical networks. We must keep in mind 
though, that the findings presented in this chapter are based on data from 2000-2005 in a 
specific context, which means it is not clear whether and how contemporary jihadist 
networks are still able to meet the needs of vulnerable migrants including those who lack 
a residence status. Yet it demonstrates that under specific circumstances and for certain 
groups, radical and criminal networks can attract vulnerable individuals who 
subsequently may be drawn into facilitating terrorism and committing crimes. This is not 
to say that ideology does not play a part, but these observations tend to remain hidden 
when we solely look at the role of ideology.  
 
